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I. INTRODUCTION
The aftershocks of September 11, 2001, reverberated deep within
U.S. society. The horrific events of that day led to over 3,000 innocent
lives lost and changed the American psyche. Instant changes to the
New York skyline, air travel, and the general sense of security were
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apparent to all, as was the outpouring of support from around the
world.
However, some changes were not so readily apparent. The military commissions set up by the President to try individuals deemed
to be “unlawful enemy combatants”1 are one example. Indeed, many
Americans did not know of or understand these commissions until
the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld2 that they violated
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions. The Supreme Court decision did not put an end
to the military commissions, but rather forced the President to go to
Congress to get authorization for continued use of the commissions.
In response to President Bush’s request, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006.3
Human rights organizations and the international community
have criticized the Military Commissions Act for failing to meet the
minimum standards required by the Geneva Conventions Common
Article 3. While the Act has many flaws regarding due process and
overreaching provisions, this Comment focuses on the Act’s treatment of rape and sexual violence. Specifically, it looks at how the
treatment of rape and sexual violence runs contrary to international
standards and why this does not make good policy.
Part II of this Comment demonstrates how prohibitions of rape
and sexual violence during wartime have evolved in international
law. Part III addresses how the Act’s treatment runs contrary to
those standards, and Part IV provides a critique on the policy created
by the Act.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Traditionally, rape was viewed as a crime of passion, not a crime
of violence.4 During wartime, rape and sexual violence was considered a natural consequence of war,5 and soldiers treated women as
“booty of war.”6 Nations often treated sexual violence as a reward or
necessity for soldiers, a modern egregious example being the forced

1. Military Commissions Act of 2006, §948(a), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
2. 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
3. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 120 Stat. 2600.
4. See Rhonda Copelon, International Human Rights Dimensions of Intimate Violence: Another Strand in the Dialectic of Feminist Lawmaking, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 865, 866 (2003) (stating how rape “was treated as a personal matter”).
5. Hon. Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 277, 279 (2002).
6. Peggy Kuo, Prosecuting Crimes of Sexual Violence in an International Tribunal,
34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 305, 305 (2002).
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prostitution of thousands of comfort women for the Japanese military.7
In the United States, however, the prohibition of rape and sexual
violence during wartime can be traced back to the United States
Civil War when President Lincoln enacted the Lieber Code to control
the conduct of Union soldiers.8 Article 44 states:
All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded
country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a
place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such
inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such
other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of
the offense.
A soldier, officer or private, in the act of committing such violence,
and disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it, may be
lawfully killed on the spot by such superior.9

Notwithstanding this explicit prohibition of rape, most laws impliedly prohibited rape rather than prohibiting it outright. For example, the Fourth Hague Convention of 190710 implied such a prohibition as respect for and protection of “family honor and rights.”11
Furthermore, while the Nuremburg and Tokyo Charters did not
mention rape12 and there was no specific mention of rape in the respective judgments, the trials included evidence of rape as part of the
“greater atrocities committed.”13
However, the charter establishing the war crimes trials in Germany by the occupying powers, Control Council Law No. 10, expressly included rape as a war crime.14 Despite this precedent, the
Geneva Conventions, while expressly prohibiting rape in both the

7. Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM.
J. INT’L L. 424, 425 (1993).
8. Kuo, supra note 6, at 306.
9. U.S. Dep’t of Army, Gen. Orders No. 100, art. 44 (1863), reprinted in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICT 10 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988), available at
http://www.civilwarhome.com/liebercode.htm.
10. Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 46,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
11. Kuo, supra note 6, at 306.
12. Patricia Viseur Sellers, Sexual Violence and Peremptory Norms: The Legal Value
of Rape, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 287, 300 (2002).
13. Kuo, supra note 6, at 307.
14. Control Council for Germany, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1946, at 50, reprinted in
60 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: DOCUMENTS ON PRISONERS OF
WAR 304 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1979).
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Fourth Geneva Convention15 and the Additional Protocols,16 do not
specifically enumerate rape as a grave breach. While categorization
of a grave breach is important to determine state obligations and
whether rape can rise to a level of a preemptory norm,17 the U.S.
State Department has stated that rape is a war crime that can be
prosecuted under customary international law and the Geneva Conventions.18 Moreover, international criminal tribunals, such as the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have
interpreted rape and sexual assault similarly.19
A. International Criminal Tribunals
The United Nations Security Council created the ICTY20 and
ICTR21 as a result of the horrific crimes against humanity and genocide, including rape and sexual violence, in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda. In fact, it was the reaction to the massive and systemic
rape of women in the Balkans that led to the first condemnation by
15. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
16. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 76(1), adopted on June 8,
1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391; id., art. 4(2)(e), 16 I.L.M. 1442.
17. See Sellers, supra note 12, at 297-98.
18. Letter from Robert A. Bradtke, Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs,
to Senator Arlen Specter (Jan. 27, 1993), quoted in Meron, supra note 7, at 427 n.22. The
Department stated:
We believe that there is no need to amend the Geneva Conventions to accomplish the objectives stated in your letter, however, because the legal basis for prosecuting troops for rape is well established under the Geneva
Conventions and customary international law. As stated in the authoritative Department of the Army Law of War Manual, any violation of the Geneva Conventions is a war crime (FM 27-10, para. 499.). Article 27 of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War provides that women shall be “especially protected . . . against rape.”
Article 13 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War provides that prisoners “must at all times be protected, particularly
against acts of violence”; article 14 requires that women “be treated with all
the regard due to their sex.” Both Conventions list grave breaches, including
willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, and (with regard to civilians)
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health. Under
the Geneva Conventions and customary international law, all parties to an
international conflict (including all parties to the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia) are required either to try persons alleged to have committed
grave breaches or to extradite them to a party that will.
In our reports to the United Nations on human rights violations in the
former Yugoslavia, we have reported sexual assaults as grave breaches. We
will continue to do so and will continue to press the international community to respond to the terrible sexual atrocities in the former Yugoslavia.
Id.
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
21. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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the Security Council of wartime rape22 and the subsequent establishment of the tribunal.23 The statutes creating these ad hoc criminal tribunals with limited jurisdiction listed rape as a crime against
humanity. However, it is the tribunals’ jurisprudence that has significantly advanced international law in prosecuting rape and sexual
violence as war crimes.
1. Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR)
The first conviction of rape as a war crime came from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the case of Prosecutor v.
Akayesu.24 Jean-Paul Akayesu was the bourgmestre (the principle
magistrate, comparable to a mayor) of the Taba commune in Rwanda
from 1993 until 1994, during which Tutsis massacred, raped, and
tortured Hutus.25 Traditionally, the commune treated the bourgmestre with great respect.26 As a result, Akayesu had extensive powers, including maintaining law and order in the commune, as well as
effective control of the communal police.27 Indeed, women and girls
seeking refuge from the horrific atrocities occurring during that time
came to him because of his position in the commune.28 However, the
ICTR Trial Chamber found that Akayesu, instead of providing a safe
haven, often encouraged or assented to the raping and forced nudity
of the women and girls who were seeking protection.29 The Chamber
held Akayesu guilty of nine counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the Geneva Conventions.30
His was the first conviction ever for genocide, and it was the first
time that an international tribunal ruled that rape and other forms
of sexual violence could constitute genocide.31 The Chamber underscored the fact that rape and sexual violence may “constitute genocide in the same way as any other act [of serious bodily or mental
harm,] as long as [such acts] were committed with the specific intent
to destroy . . . a particular group, targeted as such.”32 Moreover, the
Chamber held that rape is a violation of personal dignity and constitutes torture when instigated or consented to by a public official for

22. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
23. Goldstone, supra note 5, at 278.
24. Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998).
25. Id. ¶ 1.
26. Id. ¶ 54.
27. Id. ¶ 56.
28. Id. ¶ 422.
29. Id. § 5.5.
30. Id. § 8.
31. ICTR Press Briefing, ICTR in Context: Policy and Achievements, ICTR/INFO-913-018 (Oct. 19, 2000).
32. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 731.
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purposes of interrogation, information, humiliation, or degradation.33
By likening rape to torture, the Chamber delivered the first conviction of an individual for rape as a crime against humanity.34
In reaching this monumental decision, the Chamber was the first
to expressly define rape.35 In doing so, it refused to define rape as a
“mechanical description of objects and body parts” and instead held
that rape did not require any act of penetration of or by a sexual organ.36 The judges defined rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”37 The Chamber held that a showing of physical force was not
necessary to demonstrate coercion, but that “[t]hreats, intimidation,
extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation
may constitute coercion . . . .”38 It concluded that certain circumstances, such as armed conflict and presence of the military, were inherently coercive and could therefore constitute coercion.39
Furthermore, the Chamber found that “[s]exual violence . . . is
considered to be any act of a sexual nature, which is committed on a
person under circumstances which are coercive.”40 Again the Chamber noted physical force was not necessary to show coercion and further held physical contact was not necessary to find a crime of sexual
violence.41 Therefore, it found that ordering a student to undress and
perform gymnastics in public while naked constituted sexual violence.42
Human rights organizations heralded this decision as a victory for
prosecuting rape and sexual violence as a war crime and for demonstrating that these egregious acts do constitute torture, crimes
against humanity, and genocide.43

33. Id. ¶ 597.
34. Id. ¶ 695.
35. See Goldstone, supra note 5, at 283 (“International law had never defined the
crime of rape. That, in itself, is significant. A crime that had been occurring for centuries
during wars had never received sufficient attention to justify definition. In Akayesu, the
Trial Chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal took a major step toward filling this gap in the
law.”).
36. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 597.
37. Id. ¶ 598.
38. Id. ¶ 688.
39. Id.
40. Id. ¶ 598.
41. Id. ¶ 688.
42. Id.
43. AMNESTY INT’L, SUDAN, DARFUR: RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR—SEXUAL VIOLENCE
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (2004), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/
AFR54/076/2004.
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2. Prosecutor v. Furundzija (ICTY)
In Prosecutor v. Furundzija,44 the Yugoslavia Tribunal relied on
the progressive definition adopted in Akayesu but recast the definition of rape to require penetration as an element of the offense.45 The
Trial Chamber convicted a Croatian commander for torture and outrages upon personal dignity for a single act of rape even though the
accused did not personally rape the woman.46
In that case, the accused commander interrogated a naked Muslim woman while another soldier rubbed his knife against her thighs
and threatened that he would put his knife inside her vagina.47 She
was then moved to another room where the accused commander continued to interrogate her and another soldier repeatedly raped her
orally, vaginally, and anally in front of her friend and a group of soldiers.48
The Trial Chamber found that the victim “suffered severe physical
and mental pain, along with public humiliation, at the hands of Accused B in what amounted to outrages upon her personal dignity and
sexual integrity.”49 The Chamber defined rape as penetration under
force, threat of force, or coercive circumstances and found that the
elements of rape were met.50 Moreover, the Chamber held that, while
the commander did not personally commit the act of rape on the victim, he contributed to the acts by his continued interrogations and by
not stopping or curtailing these actions being committed in his presence.51
While this case held that a single act of rape was an outrage upon
personal dignity (which was a war crime), it did not state outright
that rape, in and of itself, is a war crime.52 However, it did find that
forcible oral sex is “[a] most humiliating and degrading attack upon
human dignity” and, thus, could correctly be included in the definition of rape.53 Finally, the court held that sexual assault could constitute a war crime and that rape may be a war crime or act of genocide
if other essential elements are met.54

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998).
Goldstone, supra note 5, at 284.
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 273-275.
Id. ¶ 40.
Id. ¶ 41.
Id. ¶ 272.
Id. ¶ 185.
Id. ¶ 273.
Kuo, supra note 6, at 314.
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 183.
Id. at ¶ 172.
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3. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovic (Foca) (ICTY)
With the increasing prosecution of rape cases in the ICTY and
ICTR, and each tribunal’s respective contributions to interpreting international law, the ICTY subsequently held that rape, in and of itself, is a war crime.55 This occurred in the Kunarac, Kovac and
Vukovic (Foca)56 case, sometimes referred to as the Foca rape camp
case.
Shortly after the Bosnian War broke out, Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav armed forces sexually enslaved and systematically raped Muslim women and girls as young as twelve in Foca, a former town of
Yugoslavia.57 Women and girls testified to horrific acts of sexual violence that ensued during this time. For example, a mother testified
how she was forced to turn over her 15-year-old daughter to soldiers
who raped her.58 Young girls testified how they were enslaved in the
homes of military commanders and repeatedly raped by soldiers who
could come and go as they pleased.59 The Trial Chamber found that
the evidence showed “Muslim women and girls, mothers and daughters together, robbed of the last vestiges of human dignity, women
and girls treated like chattels, pieces of property at the arbitrary disposal of the Serb occupation forces, and more specifically, at the beck
and call of the three accused.”60
Surveying the domestic laws of countries such as India, Belgium,
South Africa, Uruguay, and Estonia, the Chamber defined rape differently than in Furundzija or Akayesu by describing rape as sexual
penetration without the consent of the victim.61 The Chamber further
stated that consent had to be given “voluntarily, as a result of the
victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.”62 The Chamber’s progressive definition of consent takes into
account whether the victim’s will was freely and voluntarily given
and whether the victim was in detention, subject to psychological

55. Kuo, supra note 6, at 314.
56. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T,
Judgment (Feb. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Foca].
57. See Amnesty International USA, Rape as a Tool of War: A Fact Sheet,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/Violence/Womens_Human_Rights/page.do?id=1108441&n1=3
&n2=39&n3=739 (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Amnesty International Fact
Sheet].
58. Kuo, supra note 6, at 315.
59. Id.
60. Press Release, The Hague, Judgment of Trial Chamber II in the Kunarac, Kovac
and Vukovic Case (Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p566e.htm.
61. Kuo, supra note 6, at 319 (explaining Foca, supra note 56, ¶¶ 453-56).
62. Id. (quoting Foca, supra note 56, ¶ 460).
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pressure, or subject to any other condition where consent could not
truly be given.63
The Trial Chamber in Foca convicted the accused military officials
Kunarac and Vukovic of rape and torture as both a crime against
humanity and a war crime.64 It also stated that rape could be a form
of enslavement65 and convicted Kunarac and Kovac of enslavement
as a crime against humanity.66
Upon appeal, the ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected the “ ‘resistance’ requirement,” finding that use of force was not a necessary
element of rape.67 Instead, in the Foca Appeal decision, the Chamber
found that nonconsent of a victim was sufficient to establish rape.68
B. International Criminal Court (ICC)
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the International Criminal Court
(ICC) was not created by the U.N. Security Council, but rather by a
multilateral agreement, the Treaty of Rome (Rome Statute).69 Also,
unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC is a permanent court with a
wider range of jurisdiction, including rape and sexual violence.70 The
ICC explicitly lists rape and sexual violence as war crimes in both international and noninternational armed conflict,71 as a crime against
humanity,72 and possibly even an element of genocide.73 Generally,
the ICC defines rape as penetration by force, threat of force, coercion,
or where there is no consent.74 Sexual violence is defined as an act of
a sexual nature by force, threat of force, coercion, or without consent.75
It is clear that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals influenced the ICC’s treatment of rape and sexual violence. And it is
equally clear that the permanent court has advanced the tribunals’
work. As Justice Goldstone writes, “This is significant in that the
Rome Statute for the ICC represents the normative benchmark of in-

63. Id.
64. Foca, supra note 56, ¶¶ 883, 886, 888.
65. Id. ¶¶ 539-43.
66. Id. ¶¶ 883, 886.
67. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case Nos. IT-96-23, IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 128 (June 12, 2002) [hereinafter Foca Appeal].
68. Id. ¶ 133.
69. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
70. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxii).
71. Id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi).
72. Id. art. 7(1)(g).
73. Id. art. 6.
74. INT’L CRIMINAL CT., ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, arts.
7(1)(g)-1, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1 (2000) [hereinafter ICC ELEMENTS OF CRIMES].
75. Id. arts. 7(1)(g)-6, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-6, 8(2)(e)(vi)-6.

536

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:527

ternational criminal law, and gender crimes are now given the recognition they were denied for so many years.”76
C. International Standard for Prohibition of Rape and Sexual
Violence During Wartime
While it is unsettled whether the prohibition of rape and sexual
violence during wartime, by itself, has risen to the level of jus cogens,77 it is clear that, at a minimum, it has crystallized into customary international law.78 Treaties, international tribunals, and the
ICC all recognize that rape and sexual assault can constitute torture;
cruel, degrading, and humiliating treatment; crimes against humanity; and even genocide. Equally clear is that through the jurisprudence of the international tribunals and subsequent codification in
the Rome Statute, rape and sexual violence involve either penetration or an act of a sexual nature without the consent of the victim,
taking into account the totality of circumstances.
III. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS TAKE ONE STEP FORWARD, THE
MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006 TAKES TWO STEPS BACKWARD
A. Military Commissions Act of 2006: Background and Overview
The Military Commissions Act of 200679 was a reaction to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld80 in which the Supreme Court found that the military commissions set up by the
President shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks violated both
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions.81
In Hamdan, a Yemeni national and alleged Al-Qaeda member was
captured by militias in Afghanistan and turned over to the U.S. military.82 Two years after the U.S. sent Hamdan to Guantanamo Bay,
the President determined that a military commission could try him
for charges of conspiracy.83

76. Goldstone, supra note 5, at 285.
77. See BOLESLAW A. BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY, at xx (2005) (defines jus cogens as “[p]eremptory norms of general international law from which no derogation is permissible” such as prohibition of force and genocide).
78. Sellers, supra note 12, at 302-03 (arguing that, while there is “a general norm
prohibiting rape during times of armed conflict,” rape of its own volition has not risen to
jus cogens); see also Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 168
(Dec. 10, 1998) (noting that the prohibition of rape and serious sexual assault during wartime has risen to customary international law).
79. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
80. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
81. Id. at 2759.
82. Id.
83. Id.

2008]

MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006

537

The Supreme Court found that absent a military exigency, which
the Court found did not exist in Hamdan’s case, the President did not
have unilateral power to set up military commissions without congressional approval.84 Moreover, without deciding whether the Geneva Conventions were self-executing, the Court found Common Article 3 was judicially recognized by reference to the customary laws of
war provision in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.85 In doing so,
the Court determined that detainees must be provided with the necessary “ ‘judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples.’ ”86 The Court held that the structure and procedures of the military commissions, which barred the presence of the
accused and denied the accused an opportunity to view the evidence
against him, did not meet such standards.87 Furthermore, the Court
rejected the U.S. government’s argument that Common Article 3 did
not apply to the treatment of the detainees. The Court held that
while Al-Qaeda is a transnational group, Common Article 3’s “conflict
not of an international character” provision has been interpreted to
apply to all residual conflict that does not fall within the traditional
conflict among states.88 Therefore, the Court held that the Geneva
Conventions governed detainee treatment.89
While many viewed this decision as a rebuke to the Bush Administration’s assertion of broad executive power in dealing with detainees,90 it clearly allowed the President to go to Congress to authorize
such power. To that end, Congress passed the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, and the President signed it into law on October 17,
2006.91

84. Id. at 2780.
85. Id. at 2796.
86. Id. (quoting Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, art. 3, ¶1(d), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 135).
87. Id. at 2797-98.
88. Id. at 2795; John P. Cerone, Status of Detainees in Non-International Armed Conflict, and their Protection in the Course of Criminal Proceedings: The Case of Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 10 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. (2006), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/
insights060714.html.
89. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795; see also Cerone, supra note 88 (noting that the holding of the Court is limited to the conflict in Afghanistan and does not apply to any other
conflict regarding the war on terror).
90. E.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Hidden—and Obvious—Lessons in the Supreme Court’s
Divided Ruling Invalidating Military Commissions, FINDLAW’S WRIT, June 30, 2006,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20060630.html.
91. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (“An
Act To authorize trial by military commission for violations of the law of war, and for other
purposes.”); see also John B. Bellinger III, State Dept. Legal Advisor, Foreign Center Press
Briefing, Oct. 19, 2006, available at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/74786.htm (stating that, pursuant to the Hamdan decision, the President needed legislation to set up the military commissions).
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The Military Commissions Act (MCA) amends the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the War Crimes Act.92 It authorizes
and provides procedures for military commissions to be used against
“unlawful enemy combatant[s].”93 Some of the most controversial
provisions include authorizing the President to define who is an
“unlawful enemy combatant,”94 eliminating the writ of habeas corpus
for any alien combatant,95 and allowing an exception for the use of
“reliable” coerced evidence.96
Also, because the Supreme Court found that Common Article 3
applied to the treatment of detainees, the MCA amended the War
Crimes Act.97 The War Crimes Act criminalizes war crimes committed by U.S. nationals.98 Prior to the MCA, the War Crimes Act defined war crimes as conduct “which constitutes a grave breach of
common Article 3.”99 However, the MCA amends this provision to define war crimes as “a grave breach of common Article 3” and specifically enumerates and defines nine offenses that constitute such a
grave breach, including “Torture,” “Cruel or Inhuman Treatment,”
“Rape,” and “Sexual Assault or Abuse.”100 In listing these offenses,
the MCA excluded the bedrock principle of Common Article 3—
prohibition of “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.”101 According to the government, this
was necessary in order to clarify otherwise “vague” requirements.102
However, critics charge that the MCA’s treatment of Common Article
3 has less to do with providing clarity to “vague” requirements and

92. Military Commissions Act §§ 3-5, 6(b).
93. Id. § 948d(a).
94. Id. § 948d(c).
95. Id. § 950j(b).
96. Id. § 948r.
97. War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996).
98. Id. § 2441(b).
99. Id. § 2441(c)(3).
100. Military Commissions Act § 950v(b).
101. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3(1)(c),
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 3].
102. George W. Bush, U.S. President, Press conference of the President (Sept. 15, 2006)
[hereinafter Pres. Bush Press Conference], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/09/20060915-2.html (“This debate is occurring because of the Supreme
Court’s ruling that said that we must conduct ourselves under the Common Article III of
the Geneva Convention. And that Common Article III says that there will be no outrages
upon human dignity. It’s very vague. What does that mean, ‘outrages upon human dignity’? That’s a statement that is wide open to interpretation. And what I’m proposing is
that there be clarity in the law so that our professionals will have no doubt that that which
they are doing is legal. You know, it’s -- and so the piece of legislation I sent up there provides our professionals that which is needed to go forward.”); see also Bellinger, supra note
91 (stating the MCA clarifies exactly what is required because Common Article 3 provisions are vague).
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more to do with providing a shield of impunity for detainee mistreatment.103
Furthermore, the MCA self-declares that changes to the UCMJ
and War Crimes Act meet the standards and obligations set forth by
the Geneva Conventions.104 First, it states, “A military commission
established under this chapter is a regularly constituted court, affording all the necessary ‘judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples’ for purposes of common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions.”105 Second, the Act provides that this
criminalization “fully satisf[ies] the obligation under Article 129 of
the Third Geneva Convention for the United States to provide effective penal sanctions for grave breaches which are encompassed in
common Article 3 in the context of an armed conflict not of an international character.”106 It further insulates itself by prohibiting the
use of the Geneva Conventions as a source to be used against the
U.S. government or any official.107 Moreover, it limits how U.S. courts
can interpret the prohibitions by barring the use of foreign or international sources of law.108
B. Treatment of Rape and Sexual Assault in the MCA as Compared
to International Standards
As noted above, rape and sexual assault are expressly included in
the Military Commissions Act, both as a crime for which an unlawful
enemy combatant can be tried before a military commission and as a
war crime for which a U.S. national can be prosecuted in U.S. federal
courts.109 However, it is not the expressed inclusion of these crimes,
but rather how the Act defines these offenses and excludes “outrages
upon personal dignity”110 that are in stark contrast to international
standards of rape and sexual assault.
103. See John P. Cerone, Military Commissions Act of 2006: Examining the Relationship Between the International Law of Armed Conflict and US Law, 10 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L
L. INSIGHT (2006), http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/11/insights061114.html (suggesting
that amending the War Crimes Act was necessary because once it was held that Common
Article 3 applied to the treatment of detainees the possibility of prosecution was open for
detainee mistreatment); see also R. Jeffrey Smith, War Crimes Act Changes Would Reduce
Threat of Prosecution, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/08/AR2006080801276.html
(reporting that U.S. officials were worried that CIA officers, former military personnel, and
political appointees would face prosecution under the War Crimes Act for detainee treatment that could constitute a violation of Common Article 3’s prohibition of outrages upon
personal dignity).
104. Military Commissions Act § 948(b)(f).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 6(a)(2).
107. Id. § 948b(g).
108. Id. § 6(a)(2); Cerone, supra note 103.
109. Military Commissions Act §§ 950v(b), 6(b)(1)(B)(d).
110. Common Article 3, supra note 101.
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1. Narrow Definition of Rape
The MCA defines rape as the act of a person “who forcibly or with
coercion or threat of force wrongfully invades the body of a person by
penetrating, however slightly, the anal or genital opening of the victim with any part of the body of the accused, or with any foreign object . . . .”111
While the MCA’s requirement of penetration is a far cry from the
progressive nonmechanical manner in which the ICTR defined
rape,112 it finds support in both the ICTY113 and ICC.114 However,
unlike either the ICTY or ICC, the MCA narrows and restricts the
definition of rape contrary to international standards in two ways: (1)
it only recognizes forcible or coercive rape and not other forms of nonconsensual rape115 and (2) it does not recognize forcible oral sex as
rape.
First, the MCA’s requirement that rape involves penetration
“ ‘forcibly or with coercion or threat of force’ ” severely limits the
widely accepted understanding that rape occurs in many other nonconsensual forms.116 While the MCA’s definition of penetration by
force, threat of force, or coercion clearly recognizes the underlying
principle that rape occurs when a sexual act is nonconsensual, it fails
to recognize that nonconsensual sex can occur without force. In other
words, while force or coercion may be per se evidence of nonconsensual sex, other circumstances may be so inherently coercive that they
do not require proof of force, coercion, or threat of force to show nonconsent.117
111. Id. § 950v(b)(21) (emphasis added).
112. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (Sept. 2, 1998)
(defining rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive”).
113. Foca, supra note 56, ¶ 460 (defining rape as “sexual penetration . . . without the
consent of the victim”).
114. ICC ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 74, arts. 7(1)(g)-1(1), 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1(1),
8(2)(e)(vi)-1(1) (defining an element of rape as “[t]he perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim
with any object or any other part of the body”).
115. See Rhonda Copelon, Under the Radar Screen—Rape and Sexualized Violence and
the
Geneva
Conventions,
WOMEN’S
MEDIA
CTR.,
Sept.
27,
2006,
http://www.womensmediacenter.com/ex/092706.html (stating the MCA’s definition of rape
is contrary to international and domestic definitions); see also Press Release, Center for
Constitutional Rights, Bush Signs the Military Commissions Act: CCR Calls it a Blow to
Democracy and the Constitution, Oct. 17, 2006 [hereinafter CCR Press Release] (on file
with author) (stating that the MCA “defines rape and sexual abuse in a manner that is inconsistent with international law, turning back the clock on the hard-fought victories of
survivors of sexual violence”).
116. See Copelon, supra note 115 (quoting the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-366, §§ 950v(b)(21), 6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(G), 120 Stat. 2600 (2006)).
117. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 271 (Dec.
10, 1998) (finding that “any form of captivity vitiates consent”).
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This was clearly the situation in the Foca case, where military
personnel brutally raped and sexually enslaved women and girls in
brothel-like internment camps.118 In that case, a deputy commander
forced a 19-year-old girl to initiate sexual acts on his superior.119 The
superior, a defendant in the case, raised the defense that he did not
rape the girl, but rather he succumbed to her sexual advances.120 In
rejecting his defense, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that the deplorable circumstances of the camp, including rampant rapings and
extra brutality to those that resisted, were so coercive in nature that
genuine consent by the victim was impossible.121 In reaching this decision, the Chamber recognized that rape often occurs where the victim acquiesces against her will due to coercive circumstances and not
necessarily due to direct force or coercion.122
The ICTR Appeals Chamber adopted and affirmed the Foca Appeal decision in the Gacumbitsi case.123 In Gacumbitsi, the Chamber
stated that Foca Appeal established nonconsent as an element of
rape as a crime against humanity.124 In doing so, the Chamber rejected the Prosecutor’s argument that consent should be an affirmative defense with the burden on the accused.125 Despite the holding,
the Chamber stated that showing existence of coercive circumstances
under which genuine consent is not possible could prove nonconsent.126 The Chamber thereby recognized the “coercive circumstances” standard adopted by the ICTR in Akayesu.127
Consent may still be raised as a defense to a charge of rape and
sexual assault in both the ICTY and ICTR. However, consent cannot
be a defense if the victim experienced or had reason to fear violence,
duress, detention, or psychological oppression.128 Therefore, while
consent may be raised as a defense, the burden of proof is placed on
the defendant and is a high one to overcome. The defendant must

118. See Foca, supra note 56.
119. Kuo, supra note 6, at 318.
120. Id.
121. Foca Appeal, supra note 67, ¶ 132.
122. Id. ¶ 127.
123. Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeals Judgment (July 7,
2006).
124. Id. ¶ 153.
125. Id. ¶ 147.
126. Id. ¶ 155.
127. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
128. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE,
Rule 96(ii), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1, June 29, 1995, available at http://www.ictr.org/
ENGLISH/rules/index.htm (“[C]onsent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim a) has
been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear violence, duress, detention
or psychological oppression, or b) reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be so subjected, threatened or put in fear.”).
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prove why consent in a wartime situation is relevant and further
that the actual evidence is credible.129
Similarly, the Rome Statute of the ICC includes a broad provision
of nonconsent, including force, coercion, coercive environments, and
inability to provide genuine consent as sufficient to establish elements of rape as a war crime or crimes against humanity.130 This includes circumstances where sex is performed for basic necessities or
to prevent harm.131
The treatment of rape by the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals underscores the principle that rape occurs where there is no consent, and
that this can be proved by demonstrating an environment so innately
coercive that actual consent is highly improbable. The MCA, on the
other hand, ignores this reality by narrowly defining rape in only
forceful terms.
The MCA’s reliance on force and threat of force not only ignores
coercive environments but also ignores coercive relationships that
could lead to nonconsensual sex. Coercive relationships include
situations where victims submit to perpetrators because of an imbalance of power; that is, when an authority’s position has such a great
influence over the victim that true consent is impossible.
This form of coercive nonconsent is not only seen in international
law132 but also in U.S. domestic law. For example, in New Jersey,
state law prohibits without exception any sexual relationship between prison guards and inmates.133 In explaining the underlying
purpose of its state law prohibiting sexual relationships between
guards and inmates, the New Jersey Superior Court in New Jersey v.
Martin stated that the legislature “reasonably recognized the unequal positions of power and inherent coerciveness of the situation
which could not be overcome by evidence of apparent assent.”134 Simply put, there is such an imbalance of power between prison guards
and prisoners that any sexual act automatically constitutes nonconsensual sex and is a per se violation of the law.

129. Goldstone, supra note 5, at 285.
130. ICC ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 74, arts. 7(1)(g)-1(2), 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1(2),
8(2)(e)(vi)-1(2) (“The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion,
such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving
genuine consent.”).
131. Amnesty International Fact Sheet, supra note 57.
132. See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Chapter 13, §177 (stating that force
is equivalent to “exploiting a situation in which the victim is unprotected and at the mercy
of the perpetrator’s influence”), translated in 32 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES 112-13 (Stephen Thaman trans., 2002).
133. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2001).
134. New Jersey v. Martin, 561 A.2d 631, 636 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
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As noted above, international tribunals recognize that nonconsent
is an essential element in the crime of rape. Moreover, they define
consent to include whether, given the circumstances, the victim could
truly give consent. Therefore, the MCA’s emphasis on force and coercion and exclusion of other forms of nonconsent sharply contrasts
with international definitions and disregards an important aspect of
rape—environments and relationships so coercive in nature that
genuine consent by a victim is not possible.
Second, unlike the international tribunals, the MCA does not recognize forcible oral sex as rape because it limits penetration to either
the “anal or genital opening.”135 In contrast, the ICTY in Furundzija
first found oral sex to constitute rape.136 Similarly, the ICTR’s broad
and nonmechanical definition of rape would likely encompass the
same.137 Furthermore, the ICC, in addition to defining rape as penetration of the anal or genital opening, also defines rape as penetration “of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator.”138
Regrettably, the MCA, by restricting rape to penetration of the anal
or genital opening, departs from the international tribunals’ recognition of oral sex as rape.
The MCA narrowly defines rape contrary to the international ad
hoc tribunals and permanent court. It ignores widely accepted understandings of rape during wartime—that force is not required and
that oral sex is rape. Moreover, by redefining rape in this manner,
the MCA severely restricts the ability to prosecute perpetrators of
these acts.139 It creates impunity for perpetrators who do not use
force but that take advantage of coercive circumstances. Furthermore, by not recognizing oral sex as rape, it minimizes the severity of
these acts on victims.
2. Narrow Definition of Sexual Assault
As with rape, the MCA also narrowly defines sexual assault or
abuse by requiring force, coercion, or threat of force contrary to in-

135. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 950v(b)(21),
6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(G), 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
136. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 185 (Dec. 10, 1998).
137. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 598 (Sept. 2, 1998)
(defining rape as “physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive”).
138. ICC ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 74, arts. 7(1)(g)-1(1), 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1(1),
8(2)(e)(vi)-1(1).
139. See Press Release, Amnesty International USA, Amnesty International Profoundly Disappointed By Congress’ Passage of Detainee Legislation (Sept. 28, 2006),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGUSA20060929001 [hereinafter
Amnesty International Press Release].
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ternational law.140 Obviously, this raises similar issues concerning
the narrowness of the definition and its subsequent exclusion of
many acts of sexual assault that do not necessitate force or coercion.
In addition to this underinclusion contrary to international standards, the MCA further narrows the definition by requiring “sexual
contact.”141
This requirement is contrary to many decisions of international
tribunals where physical contact was not required to find a violation
of sexual abuse. For example, the ICTR in the Akayesu case defined
sexual violence in such broad terms that it did not require an act of
penetration or physical contact, thereby establishing that sexual violence included forced nudity.142 And even the ICTY—which did not
adopt the ICTR’s broad definition of rape—found that forcing women
to dance naked constituted sexual abuse.143 Similarly, the ICC does
not require any physical contact. It defines sexual violence as an “act
of a sexual nature,” thereby including nudity and sexual entertainment.144
The Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur accounted widespread
acts such as strip searches, forced parading or dancing naked in front
of soldiers, or performing domestic chores while naked as violence
against women during wartime.145 The ad hoc tribunals and the ICC
recognized this reality and adopted interpretations to ensure these
acts would not go unpunished; however, the MCA specifically did not.
Unlike the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, the MCA has a sexual contact requirement for sexual abuse and assault which would not recognize acts such as forced nakedness or sexual entertainment.146 As a
result, some of the outrages of Abu Ghraib, such as piling naked prisoners on top of one another, or forcing prisoners to strip and wear
140. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 950v(b)(22),
6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(H), 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
141. Id. The MCA defines Sexual Assault or Abuse as “[t]he act of a person who forcibly or with coercion or threat of force engages, or conspires or attempts to engage, in sexual
contact with one or more persons, or causes, or conspires or attempts to cause, one or more
persons to engage in sexual contact.” Id. § 6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(H) (emphasis added).
142. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (Sept. 2, 1998).
143. Foca, supra note 56, ¶¶ 772-73.
144. ICC ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 74, arts. 7(1)(g)-6(1), 8(2)(b)(xxii)-6(1) (“The
perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or caused
such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force
or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking
advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine
consent.” (emphasis added)).
145. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Integration of
the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women, ¶ 44,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/73 (Jan. 23, 2001) (prepared by Radhika Coomaraswamy).
146. See Copelon, supra note 115 (stating the MCA’s definition of rape is contrary to
international and domestic definitions).
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female underwear on their head, would not constitute sexual abuse
or assault.147
3. Defining Torture with Intent
The ICTY and ICTR found rape to constitute torture when it is
used to intimidate, degrade, humiliate, or discriminate against a person under one’s custody for purposes of interrogation or punishment.148 That is, rape is severe physical or mental pain or suffering
and, when used for one of the above purposes, constitutes torture.
However, the MCA’s definition of torture departs from this international standard by requiring specific intent.
The MCA defines torture as “[t]he act of a person who commits, or
conspires or attempts to commit, an act specifically intended to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his
custody or physical control for the purpose of obtaining information
or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or any reason
based on discrimination of any kind.”149
Requiring specific intent for torture effectively eliminates the idea
of rape as torture because it makes it nearly impossible to assess the
mind of the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt.150 In Foca Appeal, the Appeals Chamber rejected the defendants’ argument that
their acts of rape did not constitute torture because they did not “intend to inflict pain or suffering, rather that their aims were purely
sexual in nature.”151 In doing so, the Chamber affirmed that the act
for the prohibited purpose had to be intentional, not the infliction of
pain or suffering.152 Unfortunately, the MCA’s requirement of intent
does not follow this understanding and will therefore virtually eliminate the notion that rape is torture.

147. Id.; see also CCR Press Release, supra note 115 (arguing that some of the outrages
at Abu Ghraib, such as forced nudity, would not constitute sexual abuse under MCA’s definition).
148. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 163 (Dec.
10, 1998) (finding that “the use of rape in the course of detention and interrogation” is torture); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 597-98 (Sept. 2, 1998)
(stating that rape is a violation of personal integrity and is torture when used for the purposes of interrogation, humiliation, degradation, punishment, or discrimination).
149. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(A), 120
Stat. 2600 (2006) (emphasis added).
150. See Copelon, supra note 115.
151. Foca Appeal, supra note 67, ¶ 137.
152. Id. ¶ 153.
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4. Exclusion of Outrages upon Personal Dignity and Humiliating
and Degrading Acts
As previously stated, the Military Commissions Act excludes the
bedrock principle of Common Article 3: “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.”153 The ad
hoc tribunals relied on this provision when finding that rape and
sexual abuse constitute crimes against humanity or acts of genocide.
For example, in the Foca case, the Trial Chamber convicted the
defendant Kovac for forcing women and girls to dance nude on a table.154 In doing so, the Chamber found that the harm humiliated and
degraded the victims regardless of the defendant’s intention.155 Similarly, the ICTR in the Akayesu case found that forced nudity is a humiliating and degrading act and held that it was a crime against
humanity.156
In lieu of this provision, the MCA prohibits “cruel or inhuman
treatment,” defined as “intend[ing] to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering . . . including serious physical
abuse.”157 It further defines serious physical pain to include bodily injury involving substantial risk of death, extreme physical pain, burn
or physical disfigurement, or significant loss or impairment of a bodily function;158 while defining severe mental pain as prolonged mental
harm caused by infliction of severe physical pain, administration of
mind-altering substance, threat of imminent death, or threat of another person’s imminent death.159 It defines serious mental pain similarly except the mental pain does not need to be prolonged, only serious and nontransitory.160
It is clear that by the standards of this definition, along with the
exclusion of “ ‘outrages against personal dignity, including humiliating and degrading treatment,’ ” the MCA precludes many sexual offenses that do not rise to the level of rape or sexual abuse, such as
forced nudity or sexualized harassment, from prosecution.161 This
would include many of the violations that occurred at Abu Ghraib
153. Common Article 3, supra note 101, at art. 3(1)(c); Military Commissions Act §§
950v(b)(12), 6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(B) (defining Cruel or Inhuman Treatment as “an act intended
to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions), including serious physical abuse, upon another within
his custody or control”).
154. Foca, supra note 56, ¶¶ 772-74.
155. Id.
156. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (Sept. 2, 1998).
157. Military Commissions Act §§ 950v(b)(12), 6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(B).
158. Id. § 6(b)(1)(d)(2)(D).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Copelon, supra note 115 (quoting Common Article 3, supra note 101, art.
3(1)(c)).
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towards detainees because, while they would constitute “outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment,” they would not constitute “cruel and inhuman treatment.”162 For example, stripping, hooding, and forcing detainees to
simulate sexual acts or assume humiliating positions, which occurred
at Abu Ghraib, would not constitute sexual abuse by the standards of
the MCA.
5. No International Source of Law in Interpreting Common
Article 3 Prohibitions
Notwithstanding a potential separation of powers issue,163 the
MCA prohibits U.S. courts from using foreign law or international
sources of law in interpreting Common Article 3 prohibitions.164 This
is contrary to U.S. military justice past practices of using international law to interpret Geneva Conventions.165 Despite this past practice, the prohibition on using international interpretations would
render the forward-moving jurisprudence on rape and sexual violence by the international tribunals and the subsequent codification
by the ICC fruitless in U.S. courts.166
The MCA’s ban on the use of international interpretations precludes established interpretations of rape. For example, the definitions of rape and sexual assault in the MCA provide for instances of
“threat of force,” which has been interpreted by international tribunals, such as the ICTY, to eliminate any requirement that the victim
show resistance.167 Also, some legal scholars argue that “coercion or
force or threat of force” is just a “reformulation” of Akayesu’s “circumstances which are coercive” by pointing to the Furundzija Trial
Chamber’s statement that “the prohibition [of sexual violence under
international law] embraces all serious abuses of a sexual nature inflicted upon the physical and moral integrity of a person by means of
162. See David Scheffer, How the Compromise Detainee Legislation Guts Common Article 3, JURIST LEGAL NEWS & RES., Sept. 25, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/09/
how-compromise-detainee-legislation.php (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. See Judge Patricia Wald, Lecture at the Florida State University College of Law,
Military Commissions Act 2006: U.S. Attitude Toward International Law (Oct. 25, 2006)
(videorecording available at the Florida State University College of Law Research Center)
(discussing that the MCA’s provision prohibiting the use of international law may be a
separation of powers issue because the judicial branch, not Congress, has authority to interpret the law).
164. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a)(2), 120 Stat. 2600
(2006) (stating that, in construing Common Article 3, “[n]o foreign or international source
of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the courts of the United States in interpreting the prohibitions”).
165. See Copelon, supra note 115.
166. Id.
167. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN
THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT (2003), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2003/sierraleone/
sierleon0103.pdf.
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coercion, threat of force or intimidation in a way that is degrading
and humiliating for the victim’s dignity.”168 However, the MCA’s ban
on the use of international sources of law would preclude these established interpretations of rape and sexual violence.
Moreover, it is unclear whether rape would automatically satisfy
the element of “severe physical or mental pain or suffering” for the
crime of torture without the established jurisprudence of the tribunals because of the MCA’s narrow definition for “severe physical or
mental pain or suffering.”169 Thus, the MCA further deteriorates the
idea that rape constitutes torture.
Furthermore, Common Article 3 is a provision of international law
and, as such, the vast majority of its interpretation and meaning resides within international bodies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Tribunals. Therefore, the
inability of U.S. courts to use this widely established and accepted
body of law will restrict them to the limited body of U.S. sources of
law regarding this provision and lead to potentially absurd results.170
The prohibition of international sources of law combined with the
narrow definition of rape and sexual violence contrary to international standards halt the progressive strides of successfully prosecuting rape and sexual violence during wartime. Furthermore, the MCA
creates “retroactive immunity” for any U.S. agents implicated in violating Common Article 3 prohibitions,171 including any mistreatment
of detainees held at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.172
The Military Commissions Act, by expressly enumerating Rape
and Sexual Assault as a grave breach, goes further than the Geneva
Conventions and is in line with the ICC statute of enumerating Rape
as a War Crime. However, the MCA’s narrow definition, along with
its prohibition of the use of international jurisprudence, makes
prosecuting rape and sexual abuse during wartime a near impossible
task while simultaneously granting immunity for any past acts. By
providing both impunity and immunity, the MCA’s treatment of rape

168. Wolfgang Schomburg & Ines Peterson, Genuine Consent to Sexual Violence Under
International Criminal Law, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 121, 133 (2007) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Military Commissions Act § 950v(b)(11).
170. Scheffer, supra note 162 (questioning how U.S. legal sources, such as past U.S.
case law or secondary sources by U.S. legal scholars that cite to international or foreign
sources of law, will be treated).
171. Amnesty International Press Release, supra note 139 (“Retroactive immunity for
those who have been implicated in creating policies or participating in abuse and other
acts long believed to be torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”).
172. See CCR Press Release, supra note 115 (“[T]he bill provides retroactive immunity
for U.S [sic] military and intelligence officials for the torture and abuse of detainees, including the widely condemned horrors which occurred at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo.”).
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and sexual violence is regressive in comparison with international
standards.
IV. CRITIQUE–IS THE MCA’S TREATMENT OF RAPE AND SEXUAL
VIOLENCE GOOD POLICY?
In determining whether the Military Commissions Act is good policy one must weigh what is gained from the Act and what is lost. In
doing so, I conclude that the MCA is not good policy for three reasons: (1) it will not help, but will undermine, the war on terror; (2) it
creates dangerous precedent for other nations to use or to influence
impending tribunals; and (3) it negatively contributes to how rape
and sexual violence are viewed in society and in law.
A. The MCA Undermines the War on Terror
The Bush Administration argues that the Military Commissions
Act is an essential tool for fighting the war on terror.173 In essence, it
claims that, without the commissions and procedures created by the
Act, terrorists and their supporters would escape punishment because the criminal justice system is ill-suited to prosecute the unique
and nonconventional aspects of terrorist organizations. Moreover, the
Bush Administration argues that the real threat and danger terrorists pose make international practices no longer applicable.174 The
White House essentially argues that times have changed and established practices are “obsolete” and thus require revision.175 Furthermore, the Administration argues that the requirements of the longestablished Common Article 3 provision are “vague” and, therefore,
its scope and interpretation require clarification.176
First, Common Article 3 is not vague. There is a body of law, including both international and domestic, which clearly defines the
scope of the obligations under Common Article 3.177 Also, the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) has defined the standards as
acts which the public would find “particularly revolting.”178 Moreover,
the ad hoc tribunals have stated that humiliation “must be real and
serious and must be so intense that the reasonable person would be

173. Pres. Bush Press Conference, supra note 102.
174. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to George W.
Bush, U.S. President (Jan. 25, 2002) (the now infamous so-called “torture memo”).
175. Id. (stating that the old rules of the Geneva Conventions now seem “quaint” and
“obsolete”).
176. Pres. Bush Press Conference, supra note 102.
177. See Katherine Newell Bierman, Counterterrorism Counsel for the U.S. Program,
Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (July 19, 2006), available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/25/usdom14072_txt.htm (stating that U.S. and international courts have both interpreted Common Article 3).
178. Id.
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outraged.”179 Furthermore, the U.S. has long trained military personnel on these standards without concerns about vagueness.180
Second, developing new standards that carve out exceptions to
clearly established minimum guarantees creates a “slippery slope.”181
This occurs where the exception through time and practice ceases to
be an exception but rather a norm and consequently, new exceptions
of greater latitude are allowed.182 Thereby, it creates a dangerous
practice that becomes justified in the perpetrator’s mind on the basis
that if slight mistreatment produced certain results or did not produce any results, even better results could be obtained if a little more
was applied.183 Therefore, allowing for mistreatment, however slight,
increases the likelihood that the intensity of the mistreatment will
follow as perpetrators continually push the limits.184
Moreover, allowing mistreatment would not contribute to winning
the crucial hearts and minds necessary for the war on terror, but
would rather significantly undermine it. The U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency manual states that those who employ abusive techniques
“ ‘lose moral legitimacy’ ” and, therefore, “ ‘lose the war.’ ”185 It further states that “ ‘torture and cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment is never a morally permissible option, even in situations
where lives depend on gaining information.’ ”186 Furthermore, as Kofi
Annan stated during his tenure as U.N. Secretary-General, the U.S.
is in danger of “playing into the hands of the terrorists” when it
“abandon[s] the moral high ground.”187
In addition to contributing to a loss of moral authority, the MCA
weakens the U.S. standing as a leader in human rights.188 Human
rights organizations and the international community criticize the
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Human Rights Watch, Annan Blasts Global Failure on Darfur Horror: States
Must Respect Rights in ‘War on Terror’, Dec. 8, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/
07/global14793.htm [hereinafter HRW Annan Article] (quoting Kofi Annan in a criticism of
the U.S.: “Once we adopt a policy of making exceptions to these rules or excusing breaches
of them, no matter how narrow, we are on a slippery slope. The line cannot be held half
way down. We must defend it at the top.”).
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See Human Rights Watch, The Legal Prohibition Against Torture,
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/TortureQandA.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) [hereinafter HRW Legal Prohibitions] (explaining how difficult setting limits becomes once torture
is allowed. “If the detainee does not talk when shaken or hit, why shouldn’t the government move unto more severe measures, such as the application of electric shocks? Why not
threaten to rape the suspect’s wife or to torture his children?”).
185. Jennifer Daskal, Detainee Legislation Clearly Outlaws “Alternative” Interrogation
Techniques, NARRAGANSETT TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/
2006/11/08/usdom14702.htm.
186. Id.
187. HRW Annan Article, supra note 181.
188. Amnesty International Press Release, supra note 139.
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Act’s establishment of new standards that fall critically short of the
recognized minimum principles that acknowledge the fundamental
treatment afforded to every human being and are enshrined as certain inalienable rights in the U.S. Constitution. In doing so, they argue that instead of the U.S. leading the way in human rights, it has
compromised its standards and thereby lost a bit of its standing
around the world.189
Finally, there is much evidence to suggest that little would be
gained in the war on terror because rarely does reliable intelligence
come from abusive techniques.190 That is, information obtained by
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment often is false and professional interrogators therefore view using this treatment as ineffective and unjustified.191
B. The MCA Creates Dangerous Precedent for Other Governments to
Follow
Carving out exceptions to universally applied minimum treatment
standards creates a dangerous precedent for other governments to
follow. Enemies of the U.S. will use the newly created American
standards of treatment against captured U.S. soldiers.192 Moreover, it
will also embolden rogue governments or groups to continue employing inhumane treatment, all in the name of following the United
States.193 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering
Terrorism expressed concern that, since the United States has taken
the lead in countering terrorism, other governments will use the
MCA as a model to formulate their own domestic counterterrorism
legislation.194 Not only will this adoption lead to the chipping away of
the fundamental principles of Common Article 3, but it will also set a
dangerous precedent.
It is unclear how the MCA may affect the decisions of hybrid tribunals, such as those in Sierra Leone and Cambodia, which have yet
to render any decisions regarding rape or sexual violence. Although
the statutes of these tribunals are based on the Rome Statute, it is
unknown how rape and sexual violence will be defined. Therefore,
189. Id.
190. See Daskal, supra note 185 (quoting a U.S. Army senior intelligence officer as saying, “No good intelligence is going to come from abusive practices. I think history tells us
that. I think the empirical evidence of the last five years, hard years, tell us that.”).
191. See HRW Legal Prohibitions, supra note 184.
192. See Bierman, supra note 177.
193. Id.
194. Press Release, Martin Scheinin, Special Rapporteur, United Nations, UN Expert
on Human Rights and Counter Terrorism Concerned that Military Commissions Act is
Now Law in United States (Oct. 27, 2006), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/
huricane.nsf/view01/13A2242628618D12C12572140030A8D9?opendocument.
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the MCA may be used as evidence of state practice and its narrow
treatment of rape and sexual violence may be followed. If so, there
will be a significant decline in the number of prosecutions and convictions of these crimes, a tragic departure from the hard-fought victories of the ad hoc tribunals.
C. The MCA Negatively Affects How Rape and Sexual Violence Are
Viewed in Society and in Law
Rape laws and jurisprudence affect how society views sexual violence and shapes our cultural attitude toward it.195 Prohibiting forced
sex defines rape and sexual violence in narrow terms and potentially
creates an attitude where the victim, rather than the perpetrator, is
judged. That is, when force cannot be shown, a judgment may emerge
that it was the victim who did not act reasonably.
Laws prohibiting rape and sexual violence, in and of themselves,
are not enough. In order for true change to occur within any society,
the society must ensure that its laws are enforced.196 This occurs
when society witnesses that conduct is no longer tolerated and those
who participate in such conduct are held accountable. The MCA’s
narrow treatment of rape and sexual violence will make prosecutions
for the vast majority of sexual crimes committed by those subjected
to its provisions so difficult that impunity will replace accountability.
The MCA negatively contributes to how the crimes of rape and
sexual violence during wartime are defined in customary international law because its provisions are contrary to international standards. The Act, while prohibiting rape and sexual violence in accordance with international law, is at odds with the manner in which
these standards are defined.
V. CONCLUSION
The MCA creates a culture of impunity for crimes of rape and
sexual violence during wartime. Impunity fosters continuance, which
creates norms and standards in society. Not only is this tragic for the
victims of sexual violence and their hard-fought victories, but also for
the United States. In our fight against terrorism, we must not forget
to maintain our moral standing and enshrined national principles. A
former U.S. Navy General Counsel recently declared:
We need to be clear. Cruelty disfigures our national character. It
is incompatible with our constitutional order, with our laws, and
195. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on
Akayesu, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 940, 954-56 (2006).
196. See Meron, supra note 7, at 428 (stating that, while the ICTY’s recognition of rape
as a war crime is a step in the right direction, real progress for “combating rape can only be
made by more vigorous enforcement of the law”).
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with our most prized values. Cruelty can be as effective as torture
in destroying human dignity, and there is no moral distinction between one and the other. To adopt and apply a policy of cruelty
anywhere within this world is to say that our forefathers were
wrong about their belief in the rights of man, because there is no
more fundamental right than to be safe from cruel and inhumane
treatment. Where cruelty exists, law does not.197

While there is still much work to be done in ensuring the effective
prosecutions of rape and sexual violence during wartime, the international tribunals’ jurisprudence and the permanent court’s codification of rape and sexual violence have made progressive strides. Regrettably, the Military Commissions Act runs contrary to these efforts. In doing so, it runs contrary to international standards and
creates an acceptance for sexual violence where there should be none.

197. Alberto J. Mora, former U.S. Navy General Counsel, Speech upon accepting the
2006 John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award (May 22, 2006), available at
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Education+and+Public+Programs/Profile+in+Courage+Award/A
ward+Recipients/Alberto+Mora/Acceptance+Speech+by+Alberto+Mora.htm.

554

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:527

